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11 Introduction
A growing body of research examines the eﬀects of privatization on labor outcomes in an increas-
ing number of diﬀerent economies. For instance, Haskel and Szymansky (1993), La Porta and
Silanes (1999), Brainerd (2002), Ho et al. (2002), Galiani and Sturzenegger (2008) and Mon-
teiro (2009) analyze the eﬀects of privatization in the UK, Mexico, Russia, China, Argentina
and Portugal, respectively. While this line of research has mainly addressed the impacts on the
wage structure and wage distribution, less attention has been given to similar adjustments in
terms of employment.1 Yet, there is still little understanding of how ﬁrms adjust the labor force
after the transfer of ownership rights to the private sector. Which labor force attributes change
more during the reform? Is the labor force more aﬀected in terms of pay level, skill composition
or size? Which employees are the most aﬀected – those in top-level or in low-level occupations?
Are these changes related to changes in ﬁrms’ productivity, market share or capital intensity?
Is ﬁrm restructuring a short or a medium-term process?
This study aims to answer these questions by using the Statis (Structuration des Tableaux a
Trois Indices de la Statistique) and the dual Statis approaches to explore the main changes that
occurred in ten Portuguese banks that were privatized between 1989 and 1997. These methods,
developed in particular by L’Hermier des Plantes (1976), Lavit (1988) and Lavit et. al (1994),
are exploratory techniques of multivariate data analysis based on linear algebra and especially on
euclidean vector spaces. The central idea is to compare conﬁgurations of the same individuals or
variables in diﬀerent circumstances or moments in time. Therefore, these methods allows us not
only to identify the moments in time in which the most signiﬁcant (total) changes occurred, but
also to rank variables and individuals according to their contributions to the total changes. We
are also able to draw the trajectory of each individual (bank) or variable around its compromise
(average) position.
In the empirical analysis, we rely on aggregate data at ﬁrm-level collected annually since 1988
by the APB - Associa¸ c˜ ao Portuguesa de Bancos (Portuguese Banking Association) and available
in the Boletim Econ´ omico. This rich data oﬀers, beyond the conventional ﬁnancial information,
several ﬁrm characteristics and portrays the workforce in diﬀerent attributes. Thus, while we
draw our attention mainly to developments in diﬀerent aspects of the labor force (such as size,
1Some notable exceptions include Gimpelson and Lippoldt (1999), Brown and Earle (2002) and Christev and
FitzRoy (2002).
2seniority and payment), we are able to relate them to changes in other ﬁrms’ characteristics
such as proﬁtability, market share and capital intensity. Ultimately, we use these results to shed
some light on the eﬀects of ownership transfer on the rent sharing level, an issue that has been
fairly neglected in the economics literature.2
2 The Statis methodology
2.1 Statis
In the Statis methodology, a study is a statistical triplet (Xk,Qk,D), where (Xk)n×pk with
k = 1,..., K denotes the data table associated to the kth point in time, n refers to the total
number of individuals and pk is the number of variables in the kth data table. Qk is the metric
in the individuals space and, in general, is deﬁned by the identity matrix or by a diagonal
matrix whose main elements are the reciprocal of the variance of variables. The metric in the
variables space D is deﬁned by a diagonal matrix whose elements are the weights associated to
the individuals. The Statis method requires that the same individuals are observed in all data
tables.
The Statis method involves diﬀerent steps. In the ﬁrst step, termed interstructure, we
compare globally the series of studies. In the second step, termed intrastructure, we deﬁne
a common structure of individuals in all data tables. Finally, we identify which individuals
contribute the most (or least) to the observed diﬀerences among the studies.
In the interstructure step, we start by deﬁning an object for each data table as the matrix
of the scalar products between individuals. More precisely, we associate to each Xk a matrix of




k denotes the transpose matrix of Xk. For obtaining the distances between objects at
stages k and k0 we compute the scalar product of Hilbert-Schmidt given by
hWk,Wk0iHS = Tr(WkDWk0D), (2)
2There is some consensus that public ﬁrms tend to exhibit a higher level of rent sharing when compared to
privately owned ﬁrms; see for example Dobbelaere (2004) and references therein. Nevertheless, the eﬀect on rent
sharing due to a transfer of ownership from the public to the private sector has not yet been analyzed.
3where Tr denotes the trace operator of a matrix. Note that kWkk =
p
hWk,WkiHS .
The vectorial correlation coeﬃcient RV proposed by Robert and Escouﬁer (1976) is equiva-






















The RV coeﬃcient varies between 0 and 1, meaning that the higher it is the closer are the two
objects being compared.






















2 − 2RV (k,k0). (4)
Denoting by S the matrix of coeﬃcients RV and by ∆ the diagonal matrix of weights πk
associated to each table, a principal component analysis (PCA) based on the matrix S∆ gives
us the euclidean image of the series of studies. The coordinates of the points Ak associated with
the studies on the ith axis, are the components of the vector
√
τiγi, where τi represents the ith
largest eigenvalue of S∆ associated with the eigenvector γi. Note that if the weights πk are
equal it is enough to base the PCA on the matrix S.










where IK is the identity matrix of order K and 1 is a vector of dimension K with all components
equal to 1.
In the intrastructure step we summarize all the studies through the object W, called the








where the coeﬃcients αk are given by αk = 1 √
τ1πkγk
1 and γk
1 is the kth coordinate of the vector
γ1. A PCA based on the matrix W enables us to obtain the euclidean image of the compromise.
The coordinates of the points Bi, i = 1,...,n, associated with the individuals on the kth axis
4of the euclidean image of the compromise are the components of the vector
√
µkεk, where µk
denotes the eigenvalue of the matrix WD associated with the eigenvector εk. The correlations
of the variables with the compromise axes, enable us to interpret the compromise axes and the
compromise positions of the individuals.
In the last step of the method, we identify the individuals responsible for the deviations
between the series of studies, through the decomposition of the squared distances between two



















HS represents the contribution of the ith individual to the squared distance d2
HS,
dii denotes the ith diagonal element of the matrix D and W
ij
k denotes the ij-element of the
matrix Wk.
For visualizing graphically the individuals responsible for the deviations between the series of
studies, we represent the diﬀerent positions of the individuals for each object on the compromise
euclidean image, i.e., their trajectories. The coordinates of the points Bk
1,...,Bk
n , k = 1,...,K
on ith axis are given by 1 √
µiWkDεi.
2.2 Dual Statis
This method, analogous to Statis, focuses on the metric of variables instead of the metric of
individuals and thus requires that the same variables are observed in all data tables. Let us
consider again the triplet (Xk,Q,Dk) deﬁned as previously.3
In the dual Statis method the structure for each data table is given by either the covariance
or correlation matrix (in case of standardized data) computed as the object
Vk = XT
k DkXk. (8)
We start by deﬁning the scalar product of Hilbert-Schmidt between two objects at stages k and
k0 as
hVk,Vk0iHS = Tr(QVkQVk0). (9)
3Note that Q and Dk are, as previously, the metric in the individuals and variables space, respectively.
5The diagonalization of the matrix Z∆, where Z denotes the matrix of the scalar products
between the objects, allow us to obtain the euclidean image of the series of studies. In a second





The diagonalization of the matrix V Q enables us to obtain the euclidean image of the compro-
mise.
Finally, we decompose the squared distances between two pair of objects into percentages of


















HS represents the contribution of the ith variable to the squared distance d2
HS, qii
denotes the ith diagonal element of the matrix Q and V
ij
k denotes the ij-element of the matrix
Vk. We also represent the variables’ trajectories on the compromise euclidean image.
3 Data and empirical analysis
In this study we examine the eﬀects of privatization in the Portuguese banking industry. We
select this industry for diﬀerent reasons. First, until the mid-1990s, the privatization programme
was asymmetric and biased sectorially. Its major incidence, either in terms of number of ﬁrms
or in terms of volume of revenues generated was in banking. The privatization comprised
eleven companies, which accounted for more than 83% of banking employment in 1985 and
raised 3,3 billions of EUROS, the bulk (48%) of total sales of state enterprises until the second
quarter of 1995. Moreover, in contrast with some other economic sectors, where privatization is
less advanced and still ongoing, privatization of the entire industry was started and completed
between 1989 and 1996.
In the empirical analysis, we use aggregate data at ﬁrm level provided by APB. Given the
restrictions imposed by the Statis methodology mentioned earlier, we ended up with a balanced
panel data for ten privatized banks observed during nine years (between 1989 and 1997) with
6information on ten variables to describe both the labor and product market of the banking sector.
Regarding the labor workforce, we have information on the number of employees per bank, wage
per worker (obtained as the ratio between labor costs and bank size), share of workers in three
occupational categories deﬁned within the job hierarchy; share of workers in three seniority
groups (seniority is coded as below 6 years, greater than 10 years or other) and share of workers
in commercial or in other activities. For the variables that characterize the employment structure
(in terms of occupation, seniority and main activity) we follow the tradition in the econometrics
analysis by selecting only two variables concerning the occupational and seniority categories
and one variable to describe the main activity of workers. In practice, we use two occupational
variables (managerial (top) and middle level), two seniority groups (below 6 years and between
6 and 11 years), and one variable measuring the share of workers in commercial activities.4 In
terms of product market, we compute market share as the bank’s revenues share and capital
labor ratio as the ratio of total assets and bank size. For measuring ﬁrm proﬁtability, we follow
the rent sharing literature (Hildreth and Oswald, 1997) by computing proﬁts per employee as the
ratio of total sales net of worker costs and employment. All monetary measures are expressed
in 1997 real prices, using the Consumer Price Index (IPC) and the GDP deﬂator for wages and
proﬁts (capital intensity), respectively.
We start by identifying the points in time (years) in which the group of banks globally diverge
more (less).
Table 1: Matrix of RV coeﬃcients.
89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97
89 1.000
90 0.926 1.000
91 0.934 0.967 1.000
92 0.915 0.916 0.945 1.000
93 0.854 0.833 0.832 0.919 1.000
94 0.870 0.832 0.827 0.913 0.955 1.000
95 0.820 0.841 0.789 0.853 0.861 0.914 1.000
96 0.811 0.840 0.784 0.869 0.892 0.916 0.979 1.000
97 0.730 0.787 0.744 0.846 0.867 0.853 0.912 0.943 1.000
The RV coeﬃcients (Table 1) are high in any two pair of consecutive years, indicating
4The results remain qualitatively similar if we include all omitted categories in the analysis.
7closeness among banks over time and, hence, a continuous and smooth adjustment to the reform.
Nevertheless, in 1990, 1993 and 1995 we observe the largest diﬀerences compared with the
preceding years (see values in bold). As these points in time correspond to one year before or after
the privatization took place in all privatized banks, this ﬁnding suggests that the adjustment
occurred mainly around the introduction of the reform. In contrast, in 1991 and 1996 we
observe the strongest similarities between two pairs of consecutive years (see values in italic).5
Therefore, the graphical representation of the centered interstructure (Figure 1), where the axes
of the plan explain 69.64% of total variance, allows us to identify three distinct periods according
to similarities across banks over time. The ﬁrst period includes the years 1989, 1990 and 1991,





















































Figure 1: Euclidean image of the interstructure (Statis).
We now explore which banks explain (most of) these changes and relate to date of reform.
The decomposition of the squared distances across the banks allows us to identify which banks
experienced the largest changes and at which points in time. Table 2 indicates for each bank the
year of privatization (column 1) and the respective contribution for the total variation between
5The same conclusions are reached from the corresponding table of distances not shown.
8two consecutive years (columns 2 to 9) or between the most divergent years 1989 and 1997
(column 10). Column 11 shows the contribution of each bank for the total variation considering
all years. We also highlight in bold the banks which contribute the most to total changes in the
most changing years.
Table 2: Decomposition of the distance between two years across banks in percentage.
Banks 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 89-97 Mean
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11)
BTA 89 25.4 4.7 7.7 10.3 30.4 5.8 13.3 16.6 13.6 8.8
BPA 90 7.5 6.0 12.1 15.2 7.1 9.9 15.0 13.1 8.5 9.7
BES 91 3.8 6.5 3.1 16.5 0.4 4.8 6.2 6.4 4.2 6.3
BFB 91 2.8 10.9 6.8 7.1 10.0 5.1 6.5 2.5 6.0 6.3
CPP 92 4.7 19.7 3.3 7.7 4.4 2.9 8.5 10.1 4.5 5.4
UBP 93 13.2 6.5 2.5 2.9 13.8 9.1 7.1 12.4 5.8 6.3
BPSM 94 19.9 16.2 6.2 4.5 2.4 37.3 4.8 6.9 12.8 12.7
BFN 94 9.8 10.1 18.9 10.2 6.7 18.2 24.1 17.2 18.3 15.7
BBI 94 7.3 1.9 4.7 2.0 2.0 3.4 9.8 5.4 4.6 3.7
BCA 96 5.7 17.5 34.9 23.5 11.7 3.5 4.6 9.3 21.6 25.3
Some important conclusions can be reached. First, privatization can hardly explain some of
the largest changes in banks observed in the most changing years. In fact, the largest changes in
banks registered in the most changing years do not often coincide with one year before or after
the privatization took place, as previously advanced. For instance, between 1989 and 1990, the
changes in the banking sector were explained mainly by BTA, BPSM, and UBP. If the changes
in BTA can be associated with a change in the ownership since privatization took place in 1989,
this explanation becomes much less plausible for the other two banks considering the year of
privatization 1994. These banks changed noticeably, probably due to the increased competition
resulting from the abolishment of entry and price barriers during the late eighties in the industry.
In 1993 and in 1995 a similar pattern is observed – only the changes in BFN, BPSM, and to a
much lesser extent UBP, can be attributed more clearly to the reform. For the remaining six
banks, a relation between the magnitude of the contribution to the total change and the timing
of privatization is not discernible.
Nevertheless, the results appear to suggest diﬀerent speeds of adjustment. Some banks, such
as BTA and BPSM, seem to adopt instantaneous adjustments after ownership change, while
others, such as BFN and UBP seem to prefer more lasting medium-term adjustments.
9Finally, between the most divergent years, 1989 and 1997, the banks did not contribute
equally to the total changes as four out of ten banks – BCA, BPSM, BFN and BTA – explain
more than 60% of the total changes between these two years. Moreover, if we consider all years,
a similar pattern is found: the same banks explain a similar proportion (62.5%) of all changes
between all years. This ﬁnding implies that the privatized banks are a heterogeneous group
before the implementation of the reform and therefore some banks adjust more than others.
Figure 2, which represents the trajectory of each bank around its compromise position, conﬁrms


















































































































































































































































































































































Figure 2: Trajectory of each bank around its compromise position.
The dual Statis methodology allows us to identify when the variables globally diverge more
(less). Inspection of Figure 3, which represents the euclidean image of the interstructure for the
dual Statis, shows us that the years between 1989 and 1991 contrasts substantially with 1996
10and 1997. In fact, the correlation matrices are very close in 1996-1997 and diverge considerably
from corresponding ﬁgures in the period 1989-1991.
We now explore which variables changed the most in the most changing years. Table 3
replicates Table 2 by decomposing the squared distances between the correlation matrices across
years according to the variables used in the study. For clarity of exposition, we only include
ﬁgures relating variables whose contribution to the overall changes is above 9.5% (' 100/10).




































Figure 3: Euclidean image of the interstructure (dual Statis).
Considering all years (column 11), the pay level in the banking industry is by far the variable
that changed the most, with a contribution of 20% of the total variation. This variation reﬂects
mainly substantial changes in the quality, and not quantity, of the workforce, either in terms of
seniority or occupational groups. In particular, the correlation matrices across years show that
after 1994, higher wages are associated with a lower share of senior workers and with a lower
share of workers in managerial occupations. Seniority in our context also works as a proxy for
educational attainment. Hence, young and more educated employees are better paid according
to the human capital theory. Nevertheless, the magnitude of the change in the pay level is
likely to be also mirroring gains in terms of market share, proﬁts and capital per worker, in
11Table 3: Decomposition of the distance between two years across variables in percentage.
Variables 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 89-97 Mean
(2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11)
Employment 9.8
Occupations
Managerial 19.4 13.6 20.2 10.8 17.9 16.1 9.8 10.3 10.2
Middle 9.8 15.8 14.3
Commercial activity 10.1 11.1
Tenure, in years
[0 − 6[ 9.8 12.0
[6 − 11[ 13.9 36.6 32.0 17.5 14.6 13.2
Market share 14.7 17.9
Wage per worker 31.9 18.2 32.1 13.5 12.4 20.0
Proﬁt per worker 11.0 11.7
Capital labor ratio 10.4 26.2 12.5 9.9 10.5 12.2
particular after 1994. In fact, the correlations between wages, proﬁts and capital per worker
become stronger and positive over the period 1989-1997. This ﬁnding may suggest that wages
are responding to the proﬁtability conditions of the banks. If so, this means that privatization
leads to a positive eﬀect on rent sharing.
Table 3 also suggests that the banks initially began to change the workforce and to invest
in capital equipment. These changes led after 1994 to important changes in the product labor
market – proﬁts and market share – which fed further changes in wages.
The trajectory of each variable around its compromise position (Figure 4) also conﬁrms that
some variables have changed more than others. In particular, the variables wage per worker,
managerial occupation, tenure below 6 years and capital labor ratio exhibit ample trajectories
across both axes, implying sizeable changes in the variables over time.
4 Conclusion
This paper examines labor adjustments in ten privatized banks using the Statis and the dual
Statis approach. Our empirical ﬁndings pinpoint three important lessons. First, the analysis
of privatization eﬀects using aggregate data can be a dangerous exercise as it might obscure
































































































































































































































































































































































































Figure 4: Trajectory of each variable around its compromise position.
results also indicate signiﬁcant skill compositional eﬀects, a dimension almost absent in the
literature concerning the labor market eﬀects of privatization. Finally, we also provide empirical
evidence suggesting that privatization is associated with a higher level of rent sharing, a topic
that deserves further research.
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#￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿8 ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿% ￿ ￿ ￿/ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿0 1 ￿￿2 ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿
￿￿￿￿￿￿% ￿￿ 3 ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ 4 ￿￿￿￿# ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿& 5 ￿ ￿￿ / ￿ ￿￿￿￿  ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿0 ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿  ￿￿! ￿
￿￿￿  1 ￿￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ) ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿2 ￿ ￿ ) ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿% ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿’ ￿￿￿
￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿6￿$ ￿5 ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿ 9 ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿  ￿￿! ￿
￿￿￿  1   ￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ) ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿2 ￿ ￿ ) ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿* ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿’ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ 7￿$ ￿￿
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿" ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿’ ￿  ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ 8 ￿ ￿￿￿
￿ ￿ 9 ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿  ￿￿! ￿
￿￿￿  1 ,￿
#￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ - ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ % ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ - ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ : ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿’ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ 9 ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿,￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿$ ￿5 ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿: ￿￿￿￿’ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿& ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
: ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ 9 ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿  ￿￿! ￿
￿￿￿  1 ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿#￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿’ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿( ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿’ ￿’ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ 9 ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿  ￿￿! ￿
￿￿￿  ! 1 ￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿#￿ ￿￿￿$ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿’ ’ ￿￿￿￿￿￿" ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿" ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿" ￿￿￿￿￿￿
￿" ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ 9 ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿  ￿￿! ￿
￿￿￿  ! ! ￿
￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿+￿ ￿￿￿;￿￿( ￿￿￿￿<￿$ ￿: ￿￿￿1 ￿￿￿￿￿￿$ ￿￿￿￿￿; ,￿ ￿ ￿#￿ ￿ < ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ / ￿ ￿  ￿ ￿ ￿= ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿
( = #> ￿ = ( = #&￿￿ 9 9 ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿+￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ / ￿￿ ￿ ￿= ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ? ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿  ￿￿! ￿
￿￿￿  ! 4 ￿
8 ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿@ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿$ ￿ % ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ &￿ ￿ &￿ ￿ ￿ ’ ￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿" ￿
￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿" ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿  ￿￿! ￿
￿￿￿  ! 5 ￿
$ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿8 ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿+￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿: ￿￿￿￿" ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿* ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿
￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿’ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿5 ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿  ￿￿! ￿
￿￿￿  ! ￿￿
#￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿2 ￿ ￿ ) ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿@ ￿ 9 ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿+￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿8 ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ % # ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ " ￿
  ￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿  ￿￿! ￿
￿￿￿  ! " ￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿#￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿& ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿’ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿# ￿  ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿
￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿  ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿$ ￿ ￿ 3 ￿  ￿￿! ￿
￿￿￿  ! ￿￿
#￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿+￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ < ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿6 ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿7 ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿= ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ " ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
. ￿￿ ￿& 5 ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿,￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿’ ￿-￿ ￿￿ ￿￿" ￿. ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿$ ￿ ￿ 3 ￿  ￿￿! ￿
￿￿￿  !   ￿
( ￿ ￿ ￿ 9 ￿ ￿$ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿@ ￿ A ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿! ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿’ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿
￿￿ ￿￿ ￿> ￿$ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿$ ￿ ￿ 3 ￿  ￿￿! ￿
￿￿￿  ! ,￿
#￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ B ￿￿ ￿ ￿ - ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ % ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ - ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ : ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿,￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿’ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿,￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿$ ￿5 ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿: ￿￿￿￿’ ￿￿￿ ￿￿
￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿$ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿  ￿￿! ￿￿￿￿  ! ￿￿
0 ￿ ￿ * ’ ￿ ￿ ￿( ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿#￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿6 ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ % ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿C￿ ￿ ￿ D￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿+ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿
￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿,￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿$ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿  ￿￿! ￿
￿￿￿  4 1 ￿
$ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿8 ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿’ ￿￿￿5 ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿$ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿  ￿￿! ￿
￿￿￿  4 ! ￿
￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿2 ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿7 ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿’ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿$ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿  ￿￿! ￿
￿￿￿  4 4 ￿
E ￿ F ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿( ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿5 ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿9 ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿" ￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿$ ￿￿￿￿￿￿# ￿$ ￿% " ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿$ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿  ￿￿! ￿
￿￿￿  4 5 ￿
#￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿+￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ < ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿6 ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿% ￿" ￿ ￿* ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿& ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿& ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿
￿ " ￿￿￿￿￿￿9 ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿" ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿: ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ 3 ￿  ￿￿! ￿
￿￿￿  4 ￿￿
2 ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ < ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿2 ￿ ￿ ) ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ " ￿  ￿" ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿! ￿ ￿￿￿￿
￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ 6￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿’ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿! ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿" > ￿￿￿￿￿ 3 ￿  ￿￿! ￿
￿￿￿  4 " ￿
2 ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿( ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿$ ￿ % ￿ ￿( ￿ ￿#￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ G ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿#￿ H ￿ ￿H ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿
,￿￿( ￿￿￿￿￿ # ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿’ ￿￿￿! ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿  ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ 3 ￿  ￿￿! ￿
￿￿￿  4 ￿￿
#￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿6 ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ % ￿ ￿ ￿￿0 ￿ ￿ * ’ ￿ ￿ ￿( ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿C￿ ￿ ￿ D￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿’ ￿￿￿
￿￿￿￿. ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿- ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ 9 ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿  ￿￿! ￿
￿￿￿  4   ￿
+￿ ￿ ￿@ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿7 ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿& ’ ’ ￿￿￿￿￿￿’ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ " ￿￿￿￿￿￿ 9 ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ " ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿5 ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿" ￿￿￿￿ 9 ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿  ￿￿! ￿
￿￿￿  4 ,￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿2 ￿ ￿ ) ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿2 ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿% " ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿’ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿# ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿
￿ 9 ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿  ￿￿! ￿
￿￿￿  4 ￿￿
2 ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿$ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿# ￿￿ ￿￿￿;￿￿ ￿ ￿% ￿￿￿￿￿￿? ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ 9 ￿￿￿￿￿2 ￿￿￿@ ￿￿( ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿" ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿’ ￿A B C A ￿￿￿￿A B C D ￿￿￿￿ 9 ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿  ￿￿! ￿
￿￿￿  5 1 ￿
$ ￿ % ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ &￿ ￿ &￿ ￿ ￿ ’ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿I ￿ ￿ ’ J ￿ &￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿: ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿5 ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿’ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ / ￿  ￿￿! ￿
￿￿￿  5 ! ￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿,￿￿( ￿￿￿￿￿ # ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿% ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿’ ￿
￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ / ￿  ￿￿! ￿
￿￿￿  5 4 ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿#￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿= ￿ * ￿￿￿￿E ￿￿! " ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿$ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿( ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ 3 ￿  ￿￿! ￿
￿￿￿  5 5 ￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿#￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿  ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿  ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿% ￿￿￿￿￿￿  ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿# ￿$ ￿￿￿
￿ ￿’ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿2 ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿% ￿￿￿￿￿￿ " ￿￿￿( ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ 3 ￿  ￿￿! ￿
￿￿￿  5 ￿￿
K ￿ ’ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿#￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿+￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿;￿" ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿( ￿￿  ￿ ￿￿￿’ ￿￿￿% ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿
￿ ￿’ ￿￿￿￿> ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿’ ￿￿￿￿ ￿’ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿. ￿￿ ￿￿￿,￿￿( ￿￿￿￿￿( ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ 3 ￿  ￿￿! ￿
￿￿￿  5 " ￿
$ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿8 ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿$ ￿ ￿ J ￿( ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿6 ￿ ￿ G ￿ ￿ ’ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿$ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿
’ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿5 ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿$ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ 3 ￿  ￿￿! ￿
￿￿￿  5 ￿￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿0 ￿ ￿ ’ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ &￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ / ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿( ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿8 ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿)￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿2 ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿’ ￿
,￿￿( ￿￿￿% ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿& F ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿$ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ 3 ￿  ￿￿! ￿
￿￿￿  5   ￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿0 ￿ ￿ ’ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ &￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ / ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿( ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿8 ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿)% ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿0 1 ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿1 ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿3 ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿$ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ 3 ￿  ￿￿! ￿
￿￿￿  5 ,￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿0 ￿ ￿ ’ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ &￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ / ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿( ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿8 ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿)$ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿,￿￿￿￿￿￿ G ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
% ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿0 1 ￿￿￿￿￿,￿￿￿￿￿￿# ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿% ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿0 1 ￿￿￿￿,H ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿’ ￿￿￿0 1 ￿￿￿￿
$ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ 3 ￿  ￿￿! ￿
￿￿￿  5 ￿￿
$ ￿ % ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ &￿ ￿ &￿ ￿ ￿ ’ ￿ ￿￿)$ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿’ ￿￿5 ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿$ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ 3 ￿  ￿￿! ￿
￿￿￿  ￿1 ￿
+￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ / ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ : ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿0 ￿ ￿ ’ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ &￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ / ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿)￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿$ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
& ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿# ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿’ ￿￿￿￿￿& ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿> ￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿  ￿￿4 ￿
￿￿￿  ￿! ￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿0 ￿ ￿ ’ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ &￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ / ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿+￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ / ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ : ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿)￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿
￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿5 ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿" ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿  ￿￿4 ￿
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￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿